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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of trade patterns and market size in
a short time period, in order to identify indicators of the objectives for Chinese foreign
direct investment (FDI) into the Caribbean region. Key questions assessed are: What
makes the Caribbean particularly advantageous for Chinese investors and how does the
host country benefit? Is a higher level of trade, or wealthier markets, associated with
higher Chinese FDI? Is China pursuing some foreign policy objectives with FDI in the
region? I hypothesize that Chinese FDI is associated with trade, natural resources, or
certain foreign policy objectives in the Caribbean region. My results found that Chinese
imports and Chinese exports are positively correlated, and those Caribbean countries that
rely upon imports from China are more likely to receive more FDI, where FDI takes the
form of investments in infrastructure, agricultural and natural materials. Overall,
Caribbean nations use FDI to stimulate and develop their local economies and
infrastructure, but at the expense of the exploitation of their raw materials and natural
resources, or by entering into binding foreign policy commitments and contracts that are
not necessarily politically or economically beneficial to them in the long run.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, China has become an increasingly integral source of aid and
foreign direct investment (FDI) for Latin America and the Caribbean. Rising levels of
FDI and trade over time reflect deepening relationships between China and the
Caribbean. China continues to strengthen its ties throughout the Caribbean, as imports,
exports, and FDI flows have grown steadily since the early 2000s (ECLAC; 2011).
Figure 1: China’s Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in
2005	
  

Source: Deutsche Bank

As Figure 1 shows, Latin America and the Caribbean received the second largest
amount of FDI next to Asia in 2005. This is reflective of the continuous commitment
China provides both regions. Although these two regions receive higher amounts of FDI
in comparison to other regions, there are various factors that contribute to the attractive
nature of Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. China displays interests in a variety
of sectors across the Caribbean. As Chinese firms continue to diversify their FDI across
sectors in the Caribbean, they have increasingly shown interest in natural resources,
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infrastructure, and raw materials. Bauxite in Jamaica, timber and minerals in Guyana, and
gas and asphalt in Trinidad are a few examples of industries that attract Chinese firms.
Within the last two years China and Jamaica have signed agreements valued at
more than US$500 million for road, housing, and other projects, including the
construction of a Chinese Garden at the Hope Botanic Gardens (Gleaner 2010).
Subsequently, in 2011, Chinese national oil company CNPC also began a $6 billion
dollar expansion of Cuba’s oil refinery (Bernal 2010; Reuters 2011). Gregory Chin, from
York University, points out that, “It is not that China cannot get these commodities
elsewhere, but the additional resources that the Caribbean supplies gives the Chinese
government comfort, as well as the ability to negotiate prices”(Chin 2010). Due to
China’s consistent growth across various sectors in the Caribbean, it is clear natural
resources, raw materials, and infrastructure contributes to China’s attraction to the
Caribbean. As Figure 2 displays, the mining sector received a large portion of China’s
outward direct investment (ODI) in 2010. Chinese investment in the Caribbean appears
to reflect a concern for gaining access to minerals as well.
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  Figure 2: China’s ODI Stock by Sector in 2010

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

Source: China’s Ministry of Commerce
	
  

As China continues to indicate interest in this region, it brings forth important
questions concerning the long-term policy implications these new economic relationships
will have. The Caribbean’s economic ties with states in Asia are of concern to
neighboring countries such as the U.S. Influential shifts throughout the region may leave
traditionally dominant partners questioning their place. The Caribbean island of
Dominica is a living example of the way that China has strengthened its influence by
moving into countries that the U.S. have neglected. In 2004, Dominica recognized the
PRC signing onto China’s one policy. In return Chinese firms established infrastructural
projects worth $100 U.S. millions. China was able to use the 2008 U.S. economic
recession as an opportunity to increase aid in the region, when the U.S. was not able too.
This allowed China to be both a primary driver and beneficiary across the Caribbean. If
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China continues to build their influence throughout the Caribbean region, it raises
concerns for competition to the United States (Van Dijk 2009; Gallagher 2010).
Another concern for the U.S. is the possibility of Chinese FDI functioning as a
substitute for trade (Van Dijk 2009; Gallagher 2010; Porzecanski; 2010). If Chinese FDI
is used as a substitute for U.S. trade with the Caribbean, these effects may be detrimental
to stabilizing the U.S. domestic economy. A restriction in bilateral trade will alter the
competiveness of any nation state in the global market. In order for the U.S. to stay
competitive they must partake in trade, if the U.S. can no longer remain competitive trade
partners they may lose market share.
Some political and business leaders throughout the Caribbean are already
concerned about their domestic industries. They are fearful that U.S. export markets will
be overwhelmed by cheap Chinese imports. As China continues to grow its presence
throughout the region there are many positive implications for the Caribbean, such as the
opportunity to develop domestic markets. However, the challenges discussed in relation
to trade imbalance, the idea of a new core—periphery model, U.S. geopolitical
influences, and concerns over the Caribbean’s domestic production illustrates the
significance is assessing Chinese FDI into the Caribbean.
Chinese FDI also has implications for theories of international relations. Although
many scholars suggest that Chinese FDI in the Caribbean reflects nerorealism (that is,
that the Chinese state directs FDI in order to maximize trade, natural resources, or to limit
diplomatic ties with Taiwan); a theory developed by Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel
Wallerstein offers an alternate perspective on China’s long-term agenda. As discussed in
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the theoretical section, this theory suggests that there is a world economic system, in
which some countries benefit while others are exploited. Developed and developing
world into three subcategories, of which are the core, the semi-periphery, and the
periphery. Core countries dominate and exploit the peripheral countries for labor and raw
materials, and they are generally not dependent on any one state or country. They serve
their own economic interest and are focused on a higher skill and capital-intensive
production. In contrast, peripheral countries are dependent on core countries for capital,
usually lack a strong central government, export raw materials, and have low-skill
associated with cheap labor. If this model proves true, China’s FDI may contribute to a
new core-periphery relationship between Caribbean states and the core, which will create
great challenges for Caribbean countries in attaining economic dependence.1
Chinese FDI into the Caribbean has not been widely analyzed, due to the recent
nature of this phenomenon. Thus, my research aims to improve the prior research by
focusing on the determinants of Chinese FDI in this region. In order to identify
indicators of the objectives of Chinese FDI in the Caribbean region, I examined the
influence of trade patterns and market size over a short time period. There are three
major research questions for this study. First, what economic factors does China evaluate
in a country to determine if it should invest in that economy? For example, is a higher
level of trade, or wealthier markets, associated with higher Chinese FDI? Second, what
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Indeed, many countries within the Caribbean are questioning what growing Chinese
economic relationships will have on domestic control of the economy. What began as a
focus on economic aid has progressively diversified into FDI in other sectors such as
tourism, oil, gas, and mining. However, unlike regions such as Latin America and
Africa, the Caribbean is a more limited producer of raw materials and food (Bernal 2011;
CARICOM 2011).
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sectors are Chinese firms investing in? And what makes the Caribbean particularly
advantageous for Chinese investors and how does the host country benefit? Third, is
China pursuing some foreign policy objectives with FDI in the region?
I hypothesize that Chinese FDI is associated with trade, natural resources, or
certain foreign policy objectives in the Caribbean region. My independent variables are
trade and GDP per capita, whilst FDI was my dependent variable. In measuring these
economic factors, I investigated potential driving factors influencing Chinese FDI into
the region.
I used a data set that covers six countries across the Caribbean: Barbados, Cuba,
Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. These six
countries have the highest GDP/capita in the region in the periods of 2008-2013. The
study begins with a literature review, covering the existing literature on FDI and trade
theories in the region. After this, I present and analyze the data, explaining the methods
used to formulate my findings. I then discuss the statistical outcomes. Lastly, I conclude
with the broad implications of my conclusions on the Caribbean, China, and neighboring
regions.

Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean

Stephenson 9

	
  

LITERATURE REVIEW
Chinese FDI Policy and “Going Global”
In order to understand the trends in Chinese FDI, it is important to begin with a
discussion of recent changes in the Chinese state’s policies on outward investment.
Recent flows of outward Chinese FDI have been influenced by Chinese government’s
policy of encouraging its companies to expand overseas. FDI began to expand
exponentially to developing regions beginning in 2001. China’s economic and political
policies shifted immensely upon joining the World Trade Organization (Li 2010; Zhang
2003; Wong and Chan 2003; Wu and Chan 2003; Wu and Chen 2001; Ye 1992; Ding
2000). This act, established the platform for China’s global expansion, however, radical
FDI policy shifts began in 1979 with the integration of state guidance in FDI.
Chinese FDI policies most recognizably began in 1979 with the implementation
of China’s ‘open door policy.’ FDI was now permitted for State-owned companies under
the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade (now the Ministry of Commerce).
Regulated by the Chinese government, Chinese outward FDI facilitated China’s initial
integration into the world economy. China’s ‘open door policy’ also marked the
internalization of Chinese firms under strict control by national and provincial
government. Government control was most prevalent through direct administrative fiat,
or economic policies (Buckley 2007; Clegg 2007; Cross 2007; Liu 2007; Voss 2007;
Zheng 2007). Initial investment projects were minimal, the state allowed approximately
US$197 million in projects abroad. The following decade consisted of gradual
diversification and an increase in project allowances to approximately U.S. $1.2 billion. It
was not until 1992 that China’s FDI policy shifted drastically under the guidance of Ding
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Xiaoping’s Southern Tour Speech and his determination to create a socialist market
economy. This era was outlined by three key characteristics—rapidly increasing the rate
of FDI, expanding investments to include resource development, agricultural, industrial
production, and other service industries, and a domestic shift in policy objectives
demonstrated by the state to increase profits and influence on world politics and
economics (Li 2010; Yu et. Al 2005; Zhang 2003; Wong 2003; Chan 2003; Wu 2001;
Chen 2001; Ding 2000).
If Ding Xiaoping’s policies initiated post-revolutionary Chinese engagement with
the world economy, the final push to globalize came through vigorous state
implementation of the ‘going global’ initiative. Implemented in 2000, ‘Going global’
was a policy designed to promote continuous increases in overseas FDI. Large state
enterprises and highly institutionalized private enterprises began to lead overseas
projects. This change in policy reflected a shift from selective FDI projects to reduce
governance over economic development. Administrative controls became relaxed,
approval processes expedited, and a formerly scarce budget for foreign exchange budgets
increased (Sauvant 2005). China’s economic determination to expand took effect
immediately. State guidance and the role of policy in Chinese FDI, have been discussed
across various fields, and are still prevalent today.

The Growth of Chinese FDI in Latin American and the Caribbean: An Overview
Since the early 2000s, Chinese outward foreign direct investment (FDI) has
acquired notable attention from the global economy. Several indicators point to a
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strengthening of China’s role as an investor country. By 2004, China was the eighth most
important FDI source among the developing world and other advanced middle income
economies (Buckley 2007; Clegg 2007; Cross 2007; Liu 2007; Voss 2007; Zheng 2007).
The data in Figure 3 demonstrate the increase in outward FDI flows to developing areas
over the last decade. These statistics reveal China’s commitment to strengthening FDI to
the developing world, including investment in countries located in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Deng 2007;and Van Dijk 2009).
Figure 3: Foreign Direct Investment from the PRC (People’s Republic of China)

Source: CEIC Data Company; 2013

According to the annual statistics from the Ministry of Commerce (as cited in
Panadeiros 2010), at the end of 2006 Latin America had received 26.6% of FDI stock
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and was China’s second largest recipient of FDI between 2003-2013.. Thus, in order to
assess factors that attract China to the Caribbean, it is essential to look at what China has
already accomplished in neighboring developing regions such as Latin America. There
are numerous cases of overlapping interest in sectors, policy approaches, forms of FDI,
and geopolitical influences throughout the region.
One of the main contentions concerning China’s FDI is that investment flows are
associated with certain economic and policy objectives. This perspective dictates the kind
of investment strategies pursued by Chinese companies in their commitment to
establishing trade relationships with Latin America and the Caribbean. Indeed, China’s
approach to trade and FDI in Latin America has consisted of mainly three principles.
These principles include remaining an exporter of manufactured goods to countries in the
region, functioning as a buyer of raw materials principally from South American
countries, and becoming a strong competitor in the export market (Gallagher; 2010).
Although China’s trade patterns with the Caribbean and Latin America are different, a
comparative analysis of trade flows among China, Latin America, and the Caribbean also
show various similarities.
China is an important source of imports for all economies in Latin America and
the Caribbean. However, in Latin America, China also provides for an important export
market. Approximately 23 percent of Chilean, 15 percent of Peruvian, and 13 percent of
Brazilian exports go to China. China primarily exports manufactured goods to the region
(53% of which are medium or high tech). The region exports raw materials to China and
its trade pattern is made up of a few products. Additionally, the items China imports
from South America are very selective and reflective of its domestic demands. For
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example, Soybean seeds represent 46 percent of Argentine exports to China, copper is 42
percent of Chilean and 34 percent of Peruvian exports, and oil is 89 percent of Ecuador’s
exports (ECLAC 2008). The problem with China’s exclusive export selections are that
Central America is not an important trading partner. Therefore, large portions of Central
America are threatened by the exports of almost every country in the sub region.2
The main reason behind China’s global FDI expansion, particularly in Latin
America, is the attempt to acquire and secure natural resources. With China’s growing
population and consumption, there are simply not enough resources locally to service the
country. This places immense pressure on state-owned and private firms to secure raw
materials from markets outside of China. As the need for natural resources
predominantly drives Chinese FDI, there are several methods China takes specifically in
Latin America that creates security. For the most part, Chinese companies have invested
in Latin America to reduce their exposure to raw material price rises. This business
rationale was combined with pressure from the Government of China to secure sufficient
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  An additional problem with Chinese trade is the impact of Chinese imports in

certain markets. This problem is illustrated clearly in the case of Mexico. Mexico
competes with China in many of its exports, 85 percent, of which are under threat. This
stems from China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001
(Gallagher 2010, Porzecanski 2010). A consequence of this has been Mexico’s slowed
exports to the U.S. Although the Mexican automobile industry has been able to secure an
export market to the U.S, garment and textile producers in Mexico have been displaced
by Chinese imports and have seen immense setback (see Tuman 2014). The trade
problem Mexico faces has worsened overtime. “In 2009 the import/export ratio with
China was 15:1, creating a trade deficit of over U.S. 30 billion- and a trade problem of
growing political dimensions (Lall; 2005, Weiss; 2005). This disparity in exports and
competition received from China also has affected their local social and political
communities. Due to a large number of Chinese imports, local producers and business in
Mexico have left workers unemployed and out of business. Although this is one of the
challenges trade can have on FDI relationships, there appears to be consistent factors that
drive Chinese FDI into Latin American and the Caribbean” (Gallagher 2010).
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supplies of energy and raw materials. Additionally, consumption in China has doubled in
the past decade, compared with an increase of only 11% in the rest of the world. This has
stimulated growth for companies that are in the raw material industry. Accordingly, over
90% of confirmed investments by Chinese companies in Latin America have gone to
natural resource extraction (ECLAC 2011). Rising prices in raw materials have
prompted many governments to adopt strategies that insure sufficient supplies of the
resources. China has taken diplomatic and trade measures to obtain their own supplies
and resources. This is inclusive of FDI, donations to exporting countries, and purchasing
contracts that are long-term. In 2009, the bank lent U.S $10 billion to the Brazilian
company Petrobras, in exchange for 200,000 barrels of oil a day. It also lent the
government of Bolivia US $10 billion in 2010, where the repayment plan is distributed in
oil exports. These contracts allow China to create security in the material they need to
meet their high consumption levels.
In light of China’s growing demand, there is a large incentive for Chinese
companies to explore investments in agriculture, fisheries, and forestry resources. As
discussed below, this is also a potential motivator for Chinese companies to invest in the
Caribbean. Indicators of a strong demand from China for natural resources and
agriculture together in Latin American and the Caribbean will create potential FDI for
sectors in crops, livestock, and forestry. However, Caribbean countries will need to take
caution as consequences of foreign rights to agricultural sectors come at the expense of
the livelihoods of locals in rural areas.
Another potential driver of Chinese FDI is the objective of gaining access to local
markets. Companies contracted to build public works and industrial infrastructure have
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developed their capacities in the Chinese market, and are looking to expand
internationally. Some manufacturing companies chose FDI as a mean of serving specific
markets, instead of exporting. This allows the company to provide a service in an
international market, supplying a demand, whilst providing the company the ability to
outsource labor.3
Most countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean believe that
infrastructure is vital for its development and would like to see more FDI into
construction. This poses as an incentive for host countries, looking to attract Chinese
FDI. Infrastructure is undoubtedly the sector that has received the most Chinese
investment in Latin America and the Caribbean after mining and hydrocarbon. Figure 4
displays future projections of sectors for investment, of which infrastructure is predicted
to maintain a large percentage of FDI.
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  China has also been known to diversify in order serve a global market. These are

companies that simply cannot function in China, due to inaccessibility, a lack of demand,
and unavailable resources such as minerals and raw materials. The last factor that has
been seen to drive Chinese FDI in Latin America has been efficiency-seeking investment.
As production costs go up, more companies are choosing to move production outside to
reduce overall costs. The Chinese government openly supports diversification and the
acquisition of natural resources and key assets, while market-seeking and efficiencyseeking strategies are supported to a lesser degree or not explicitly.
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Figure 4: Future Investments by sector in Latin America from 2001-2006

	
  	
  

Source: CEPAL/ECLAC (2002)

Throughout Latin America many companies have developed their capacities
thanks to large sums of FDI placed into infrastructure. For example, investments in
railways have increased tremendously since 2005, reaching U.S $124 billion in 2010.
China’s methods of investing in infrastructure in Latin America are typically completed
through one of three routes. These routes include acquiring existing assets, infrastructurebuilding under binational agreements, and channeling investment through public tenders.
Through utilizing these strategies to pursue infrastructure investment both countries are
able to benefit, suggesting notions of a symbiotic relationship.
Infrastructure investment in the Caribbean is largely characterized by
infrastructure-building that occurs through bilateral agreements. Infrastructure-building
under binational agreements typically begin with the Chinese government offering
financing in the form of a loan to the partner government, under the condition that work
is carried out by the Chinese company. This has happened numerous times across the
Caribbean in recent years. For example, in the Bahamas U.S. $59 million investment has
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been provided to build a motorway and the National Stadium saw an investment of U.S.
$40 million. Additionally, a national stadium is also being built in Costa Rica with a net
worth of U.S. $100 million. In Barbados, several projects are under way. These include
construction of St. John Polyclicin, Sherbourne Conference Centre and Empire Theatre,
and renovation of Cheapside Market (Tax News 2011. ECLAC 2011). In January 2011,
Antigua and Barbuda received a soft loan from China for U.S. $45 million to build a new
airport carried out by Chinese companies, which normally import both the materials and
components and the labor. These methods are increasingly important to the Caribbean.
However, because Chinese companies in this sector import labor from China it can have
a negative impact on the local economy since it fails to generate new jobs or develop
capacity among local providers (MOFCOM 2010).
Another potential incentive that allows host countries to benefit from investments
is manufacturing for the domestic market. Chinese FDI into manufacturing receives a
large percentage of China’s overall FDI, as exhibited in Figure 5. Although the data in
Figure 4 suggest that Chinese FDI in manufacturing is only a small percentage (4.3%),
one can see examples of the importance of manufacturing FDI in some countries.
Chinese firms have exhibited this largely in Brazil. In almost every case, products are
made exclusively for the domestic market, and are not exported to other countries in the
region (Deng; 2004). This again, creates a mutualistic relationship between the host and
the lender. The host is able to use domestic products created, while the lender gains the
ability to outsource labor, and receive materials as a form of repayment for resource rich
countries.
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Figure 5: Chinese FDI Flow into Manufacturing Industry

Source: World Bank Organization

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  

To summarize, Chinese FDI behavior throughout Latin America provides some
clues about the sources of Chinese FDI behavior in the Caribbean. As discussed, there are
various sections that overlap in FDI acquisition, benefits on both the host and lending
end, possible indicators of why Latin America and the Caribbean may be attractive areas,
types of FDI and investing strategies China has regularly employed throughout Latin
America, and the relationship between trade and FDI in both regions. Although there are
many similarities, the Caribbean is still extremely distinct from Latin America in relation
to geographical proximity, historical relationships, economic stability, development, and
markets. Thus, it is critical to look at what China has done specifically in the Caribbean.
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Trends in Chinese FDI in the Caribbean
Having discussed the general trends in Chinese FDI across Latin America, I now
turn to a more focused discussion of FDI in the Caribbean. China has established itself as
a significant economic partner throughout the Caribbean region. Importation of Chinese
goods and services has grown steadily in the Caribbean. Since 2000, Chinese state banks
have established themselves as the leading lenders in the region. By 2010, China has
extended about $35 million in credit to the Caribbean, primarily through grants and loans
for large-scale public works projects (Bernal 2011). As Chinese finance and FDI
continues to expand into the Caribbean, many political scientists and economists question
what factors drive Chinese investment explicitly into the Caribbean region.
As seen in Table 1, the Dominican Republic received $0.60US million in Chinese
FDI in the year 2008. However, the country did not receive any inflows in 2007.
Barbados went from $2.42US millions in 2007 to $3.25US millions in 2008. Jamaica’s
receipt of FDI spiked from $0.02 US millions in 2007 to $2.16 US millions in 2008.
Cuba experienced an increase from $66.49US million in 2007 to 72.05 US millions in
2008. St. Vincent and the Grenadines rose from $20.80US millions in 2007 to $32.49US
millions in 2008 (Bernal 2010; Chinese Statistical Bulletin of Outward Foreign Direct
Investment 2011).
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Table 1: Chinese FDI Stock by Country in the Caribbean 2003-2011 U.S. Millions
Country
Antigua and Barbuda
(PRC)
Bahamas (PRC)
Barbados (PRC)
Belize (PRC)
Cuba (PRC)
Dominica (PRC)
Dominican Republic
(ROC)
Grenada (PRC post
2005)
Guyana (PRC)
Jamaica (PRC)
St. Vincent/ The
Grenadines (ROC)
Suriname (PRC)
Trinidad and Tobago
(PRC)
Total

2003
0.20

2004
0.20

2005
0.40

2006
1.25

2007
1.25

2008
1.25

2009
1.25

2010
1.25

2011
4.84

44.45

80.10
1.87

14.69
1.65
33.59

0.60
3.25
0.08
72.05
0.70
0.60

1.60
6.00
0.08
85.32
0.70
0.12

1.60
3.13

14.85

56.51
2.42
0.02
66.49
0.70

1.60
3.88

13.95

17.52
2.01
0.02
59.91
0.70

68.98
4.15
0.12

146.37
8.15
0.12

4.03

7.53

7.65

7.65

14.25

14.54

8.60
0.02
14.92

68.60
0.02
20.80

69.50
2.16
32.49

149.61
2.16
23.03

183.71
4.37
36.19

135.13
39.07
36.20

14.04

12.86

5.60

5.60

5.60

12.27

10.06

10.25

13.02

32.21
0.80

65.28
0.80

67.70
0.80

68.80
0.80

78.84
0.80

78.84
0.90

88.30

125.73

81.22

141.99

290.42

258.83

347.12

398.14

468.89

Source: Chinese Statistical Bulletin of Outward Foreign Direct Investment, 2011.
Compiled by Author.

Objective of Chinese FDI in the Caribbean
Previous literature has discussed Chinese FDI’s emphasis on resources. Natural
resources and sector targeting are large attractors to Chinese FDI to the region,
specifically throughout the Caribbean. Resource-seeking FDI is particularly different in
this region because unlike Latin America, the Caribbean does not have an abundance of
oil and gas. Chinese investment in 2003 was predominantly focused on resource
exploitation, processing and manufacturing, and service trades. Resource-seeking FDI is
driven by the need to acquire raw materials and energy sources that are scarce
domestically. As previously mentioned Latin America provides raw materials to China
through exports. In contrast, the Caribbean imports a substantial amount of manufactured
products for domestic consumption from China. In return for products they offer rich
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resources in agriculture, infrastructure projects, tourism, and mining. Together these
resources assist to make the Caribbean an attractive region to invest in.
The importance of natural resources is illustrated in the case of Jamaica. Sugar
cane is a very important sector. “Following a privatization in Jamaica, the Chinese trader
Compant Sugar bought assets worth US $92 million. The operation includes the lease of
30,000 hectares of land for 50 years to cultivate sugar cane, improvements in sugar cane
fields, and mills for US $126 million during the first phase and a possible expansion to
include a refinery and an ethanol plant for US $221 million (Financial Times 2011).
Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana have taken the lead in presenting
themselves as strategic areas of interest to China, among the CARICOM countries.
Trinidad offers gas and asphalt, bauxite in Jamaica, and timber, bauxite, and minerals in
Guyana. Economic sector distribution for FDI in 2003 reflected 23% resource
exploration, 42% service trade and commercial service, 25% processing and
manufacturing, and only 8% allocated across various other sectors (China Commerce
Yearbook 2004). In 2004 China increased their initiatives to diversify, which expanded
their percentage of FDI into resources. Industry distribution mainly flowed 52.8% into
mining, 26.5% in commercial services, 13.5% in manufacturing, and 3% to retail (Li
2010; Xilin 2004; China Commerce Yearbook 2005). China’s Ministry of Commerce
reported that foreign direct investment in the Caribbean totaled nearly $7US billion in
2009, a more than 300% increase from the 2004 foreign direct investment of $1.7US
billion. By 2010 China has extended more than $35US million in credit to the Caribbean.
China’s FDI in the Caribbean region totaled almost $500US million by the end of 2010.
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According to resource-seeking FDI theory, China will continue to search for resources,
and raw materials in areas that are developing in order to minimize operation costs.
Another reason China may find the Caribbean an attractive region for investment
is due to their ability to outsource labor. As China’s population continues to expand there
is a greater demand for food and energy. In 2004, China agreed to undertake
infrastructural development projects totaling over US$100 million in Dominica. These
projects entail a sports stadium, a grammar school, major road developments, and
rehabilitation of the Islands major medical facility (Sanders 2011). Chinese immigration
to Latin American and Caribbean countries is not a new phenomenon. However, over the
past five years there has been an influx of thousands of Chinese immigrants across the
Caribbean employed to work on local projects.
Increased Chinese migration has been widely demonstrated in Suriname.
Suriname, formerly known as Dutch Guiana, has a growing Chinese demographic. Data
from China’s embassy estimates that 10 percent of Suriname’s population is Chinese.
This calculates to approximately 40,000 people in a population of about 500,000. Chinese
laborers from China Dalian International, which is upgrading Suriname’s roads, reside in
camps along the forest. Suriname’s growing Chinese community supports two daily
newspapers and a new television station with 15 employees that broadcast each day in
Mandarin. Although Suriname is the most discussed case of Chinese immigration, other
Caribbean countries are seeing a larger Chinese presence also. Countries such as Jamaica,
Cuba, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, are all seeing Chinese business owners opening
convenience stores and restaurants across the Caribbean. China’s ability to outsource
labor in large numbers may be a reason for continuous interest in the Caribbean.
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As Chinese FDI continues to rise, there has been a notable effect on trade. Trade
volumes have increased at an annual average rate of 32.7 percent from the years 20082013 (Wu 2013). Trade between China and the Caribbean has dramatically expanded.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade between China and the
Caribbean community specifically CARICOM members have grown exponentially.
CARICOM’s 15 member regional group grew, which resulted in financial growth by a
factor of 100 between 1990 and 2008, from a paltry $20 million to over $2 billion
(Erickson 2009). China’s top two trading partners in CARICOM are Antigua and
Barbuda. They are followed by Tobago, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Dominica. Although
trade is extremely prevalent in these countries, it is also one-sided. In 2008, 93 percent of
CARICOM-China trade came in the form of Chinese exports to the region. The only
outlier was Dominica, whom approached a balance exporting over $60 million in goods
to China in that year. In the last ten years, Chinese exports have consistently made up
more than 70 percent of total trade (IMF Trade Statistics Directory). This imbalance may
cause concern for Caribbean countries economies and lead to shifts in domestic policies.
This is indicative of the severe economic imbalance that Caribbean and Chinese
economic relationships face.
As discussed below, China may attempt to use its economic leverage in the
Caribbean to isolate countries that continue to offer diplomatic recognition to Taiwan. In
China’s continuous efforts to gain sole diplomatic recognition over Taiwan, state
guidance in FDI policies can shape foreign economic policy in accordance with this
agenda. Beijing and Taipei may utilize investment, lending, development aid, technical
assistance, and academic cooperation strategies in order to acquire diplomatic support
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throughout the Caribbean region. There have been several accounts of this economic FDI
behavior since the early 2000s.
In October 2010, for example, the Bank of China and China’s foreign Trade Bank
stated they would extend U.S $462 million dollars in financing for an exclusive tourism
complex in Punta Perla in the eastern part of the Dominican Republic. In February of the
same year, Taipei had allocated funds in the form of soft loans and grants to their ally-St.
Vincent and the Grenadines. Ambassador to St. Vincent the Grenadines, Camillo
Gonsalves, met with Taiwanese officials over the construction of the country’s
international airport and other issues. The airport is scheduled for completion in 2013. To
further diplomatic initiatives, Prime minster of Guyana (Beijing ally) Samuel Hinds
received the ‘Medal of China-Latin America Friendship.’ The award was bestowed on
behalf of a delegation from the Chinese-Peoples Association for Friendship. Additionally,
recognition was given to Barbados, as a good friend and important partner to China.
China has also expanded their monetary diplomacy strategies beyond the realm of trade
and investments. In October 2011, China pledged military assistance worth U.S $1.1
million USD to the Jamaican Defense Force (JDF). This initiative is funded by Chinese
investments.
In sum, the Caribbean region attracts Chinese FDI due to its size and extensive natural
resources, agriculture, and raw materials. In the next section, I discuss various other
theories that assist us in interpreting the implications of Chinese FDI throughout the
Caribbean.
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
There are various theorists in economic foreign economic policy and international
relations that seek to explain what nation states try to achieve in the external realm, and
why. One school of thought in international relations theory, which attempts to provide
the framework for understanding how states seek to maximize their security by making
strategic choices about foreign economic policy, is that of Neorealism (also referred to as
Structural Realism). In understanding Neorealism, we can better understand how
countries interact with each other, and can utilize FDI to gain economic power. In what
follows, I discuss the theory of Neorealism and how it might be applied to Chinese FDI
behavior. In addition, I discuss World Systems theory as an alternative perspective.
Neorealism and Chinese FDI
Realism comes in multiple variants that aim to highlight actions in the
international system on state behavior. A subcategory of realism that most parallels the
behavior of the Chinese state in FDI patterns is that of neoclassical realism. Neorealism
includes some general assumptions about the motivation of individual states, but departs
from classical realism in suggesting that states make foreign policy independent of
domestic interests. Neorealism also purports that the international system is characterized
by anarchy. Anarchy does not imply chaos, but only that there is no world government to
enforce outcomes in the international system (Goldstein; 2010)
Neorealists adhere to the argument that the goal of a state’s foreign policy is
driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its
relative material power capabilities (Desch 1997; Glaser 1996). They argue that relative
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material power establishes the basic parameters of a country’s foreign policy. By defining
‘power’ in relation to capabilities or resources of which states can influence each other,
and ‘interests’ in relation to goals or preferences that guide the country’s external
behavior. Instead of assuming that states seek security, neoclassical realists assume that
states respond to the uncertainties of international anarchy by seeking to control and
shape their external environment. In this way, states may adopt foreign economic policies
(that involve trade and FDI) to enhance their power capabilities. Empiricists claim that
material powers , acquired in the long run, will shape the magnitude and ambition of
foreign policies: as their relative power rises states will seek more influence abroad, and
as it falls their actions and ambitions will be scaled back accordingly (Waltz 1997).
Characteristics demonstrated in Chinese FDI behavior lead theorists to believe that China
alludes to neoclassical realist behavior are in the case of Taiwan, and timing in
intervention.
As noted, much of the literature on Chinese FDI discussed the important role of
the Chinese state in directing outward FDI in order to achieve certain national objectives.
Currently, company investment projects have to be approved by the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which reports to the State Council, or
the Ministry of Commerce, and by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange
(SAFE). Other factors taken into account are the presence of state owned companies,
whether it involves obtaining natural resources, and whether the destination of the
investment is an entity with which China does not have diplomatic relations with the
NDRC. The process to approve FDI projects usually takes no more than 25 working days
(RBS 2009). The incentive to invest abroad has become so critical to Chinese companies

Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean

Stephenson 27

	
  

that the government offers subsidies to firms that invest abroad in certain priority areas
such as natural resources, manufacturing and infrastructure projects that involve
exporting Chinese technology. Almost all Chinese companies today are state owned, or
state influenced. Their shareholders often include public institutions, and retain a link
with local government as a means of facilitating the company’s operations in it home
municipalities. This is primarily due to the continued pursuit of national economic
imperatives with state-owned enterprises being utilized as an instrument of policy.
Although state owned guidance and policy is important in understanding Chinese FDI, it
cannot be explained as the sole response to Chinese FDI in the Caribbean.
Consistent with Neorealism, the state not only takes the lead in FDI decisions, but
it may also try to use FDI in the Caribbean to achieve national objectives. For example,
recent flows of Chinese FDI took off at a time when world flows were plunging owing to
the financial crisis in 2008. China’s investment overseas in 2008 exceeded US $50 billion
for the first time and in 2009 China was the world’s fifth largest investor country. This
was clearly the case in the Caribbean as the U.S. was facing a national economic
recession; neighboring regions faced economic instability, allowing China to intervene.
Reasons why China may strategically invest in times of financial vulnerability may be
found in the host countries response to help. Host countries in the Caribbean that are
financially weak may offer stronger incentives at the lender’s benefit, offer flexible
negotiations, and can work to monopolize a region completely. This behavior aligns with
that of Neorealism because China assumes the position of responding to the uncertainties
of international anarchy by seeking to control and shape the external environment.
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The Chinese state’s emphasis on trade and FDI in the Caribbean may also be
understood through a Neorealist framework. As noted in the literature review, FDI has
been used to expand Chinese imports of important raw materials. This is also evident in
the Caribbean. In 2008, for example, Antigua and Barbuda became China’s top trading
partner in the Caribbean with an average worth of U.S $600 million. Trade standards
between China and the Caribbean community are outlined through the CARICOM
agreement. 4
Finally, China’s battle of monetary diplomacy with Taiwan reflects patterns of
behavior rooted in Neorealism. China uses its domestic policy to shape their foreign
economic policy and FDI in order to acquire more material power to spread their
influence abroad. Neorealist thought defines ‘power’ in relation to capabilities or
resources of which states can influence each other, and ‘interests’ in relation to goals or
preferences that guide the country’s external behavior. They are utilizing their power viz.
economic resources of FDI to influence the Caribbean to attain their domestic goal in
fulfilling the ‘One China Policy’ across the region. Beijing’s desire to see change in the
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  The CARICOM agreement originally began as the ‘The Caribbean Free Trade
Association’ (CARIFTA), and was founded by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana,
and Trinidad and Tobago on December 15 1965, with the signing of the Dickenson Bay
Agreement (the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Free Trade Association). They
were joined on July 1, 1968 by Dominica, Grenada, St Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Lucia
and St Vincent and the Grenadines; and on August 1, 1968 by Montserrat and Jamaica.
The last country to join in 1971 was Belize. CARIFTA became known as ‘The Caribbean
Community’ (CARICOM) in 1973, of which CARICOM has been actively in place since
its formation. CARICOM was intended to encourage balanced development of the region
by increasing trade through buying and selling more goods among the member states,
diversifying trade in order to expand goods and services available for trade, and
liberalizing trade throughout reoccurring tariffs and quotas on goods produced and traded
within the area. 	
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global balance of power will require a network of allies from the Caribbean, in
converting Taipei allies to Beijing.
In the past few years China has taken an aggressive approach in attempting to
dissuade Taipei’s ability to invest into the region. One of the approaches China has taken
to achieve this is the implementation of a policy that attempts to make diplomatic
recognition of China verses Taiwan a zero sum game. Thus, Beijing suggests that any
state that recognizes Taipei does so at the risk of losing economic relations with China.
Only 23 countries that still recognize Taiwan, and all 11 of them are in the Caribbean and
Latin America region. Due to the high number of countries that still recognize Taiwan the
Caribbean is a competitive arena in which both Beijing and Taipei have strong interests.5

World Systems Theory
Another theory that might be useful to understand Chinese FDI is that of
Immanuel Wallenstein’s Core-periphery model (and the associate model of Andre
Gunder Frank on Latin America). As mentioned in the introduction, core countries
usually exploit peripheral countries for labor and raw materials. However, core countries
are usually capitalist and serve the interests of the economically powerful, because they
are focused on higher skill and capital-intensive production. Core countries tend to be
powerful, and with this power these countries pay lower prices for raw goods and exploit
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  Due to the small number of countries in my statistical sample, and the lack of variation,
I will not be able to examine the influence of diplomatic recognition of Taiwan on FDI.
However, recent studies of Latin America and Africa have noted that diplomatic
recognition is negatively associated with FDI flows (Tuman and Shirali 2015).	
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cheap labor, which reinforces the inequality seen between the core and periphery (The
Capitalist World- Economy; 1979; Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment;
1979).
Periphery countries fall on the low end of the economic spectrum, and lack a
strong central government and may be controlled by other states. These are countries that
predominantly export raw materials to the core countries, or they are dependent on core
countries for capital and have underdeveloped industries. Periphery countries are often
characterized by low-skill, labor intensive production. These traits and behaviors
represent the periphery.
When this theory is put into practice it presents a deeply rooted dependency from
the periphery to the core. Periphery states are vulnerable to exploitation because they rely
on the core for trade, investment, loans, and technology. However, the dependency is
completely asymmetrical and one-sided. Core countries don’t necessarily need resources
from the area they are exploiting, but Periphery countries become dependent on the
receipt of manufactured goods, technology, investment and loans for capital, where they
are forced to sell raw materials and agricultural products very cheaply in return to the
Core.
Scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank have found evidence of emulated Coreperiphery models in Latin America, which may raise concerns for Caribbean countries.
Latin American economies were predominantly creating cash crops and raw materials.
FDI was being used to create foreign owned plantations, but did not expand the industry
or help countries develop. It resulted in global capitalism forcing countries into a state of
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under-development. Frank’s study focused on Chile and Brazil. Frank’s findings on Chile
help to characterize what a core-periphery model looks like in application.
“Chilean history suggests the conquest not only incorporated this country fully
into the expansion and development of the world mercantile and later industrial
capitalist system but that it also introduced the monopolistic metropolis-satellite
structure and development of capitalism into the Chilean domestic economy and
society itself. This structure then penetrated and permeated all of Chile very
quickly. Since that time and in trade imperialism, and the present, Chile has
become increasingly marked by the economic, social, and political structure of
satellite underdevelopment. This development of underdevelopment countries
today through the acute polarization of Chile’s domestic economy” (Frank 1979,
21-22).
The Chilean example demonstrates the self-perpetuating model of economic
underdevelopment, and forces Chile to depend on the Core due to its inability to develop
on its own. As Caribbean countries continue to deepen economic ties with China through
FDI, government officials should take note of the previous case study of Chile. Periphery
countries appear to be developing, however the relationship is reinforcing
underdevelopment due to a dependence on FDI. The receipt of FDI, trade, and soft loans
used to promote development among Caribbean countries may deter independence in the
long-run due to institutionalized dependency. If this model proves true to China and the
Caribbean, this may be detrimental to the economic development of the developing
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Caribbean region. In accordance with this theory, countries across the Caribbean may
need to tread cautiously in creating a dependence on China in order to develop.6
Wallenstein’s core-periphery model, in addition to neorealist theory assists to
address broader concerns for the Caribbean. These are the implications of China’s global
strategy. China’s ability to outsource labor to the Caribbean may allude to a larger
strategy that utilizes demographics among a population as a method of foreign policy.
Neorealist perspectives outline China’s capability to circumnavigate through specific
economic policies designed to enhance their stance in the global market. While the coreperiphery model alludes to the notion that reinforcing underdevelopment in the Caribbean
may further institutionalize dependency. As the Chinese population increasingly grows
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   Investment and trade linkages have been studied most widely by Harry Broadman, in

“Africa’s Silk Road.” His study uses Africa, India, and Asia to illuminate how firms
engage in trade of intermediate goods (or services) through FDI, or through
subcontracting which has been a key agent in transforming the global economy
(Broadman 2007). As a result of these phenomena, there has been a rapid growth of intraindustry trade, also known as network trade.
China has moved progressively from production and trade in labor-intensive, low
value- added products to production and trade in higher stages of the value chain. With
China’s growing middle class and increasing purchasing power, there is a large demand
for imported goods. This follows that China is in search of higher value-added goods and
services. China’s imports as a percentage of GDP are more than 25%, while for the
United States, EU, and Japan they are only 15%, 14%, and 11% respectively (Broadman
2007). Through analyzing the ways in which businesses operate in Africa with a focus on
the linkages between their investment and trade activities, the literature examines where
opportunities for network trade might exist in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is accomplished
through assessing the characteristics of select country-level- industry value chains in
Africa in comparison to international competitor. Broadman’s results suggest that some
of the concerns raised by World System’s theory are valid, but others are not. In
particular, while African countries are at a disadvantage, he finds that some countries
have been able to improve their standing after receiving higher levels of Chinese FDI.
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within the Caribbean, it opens the possibility to further reinforce Chinese ideals in the
form of reproduction. By recreating a demographic that is largely of Chinese-Caribbean
decent, it would assist to institutionalize Chinese norms and ideas throughout a region
that is particularly close to the West. China continues to utilize geopolitics to reinforce
power; however as Wallerstein and neorealist theorists discuss it raises broader
implications through their global agenda.

RESEARCH DESIGN
The following section details the hypothesis, data and methodology for the
statistical analysis of Chinese FDI in the Caribbean. The hypothesis that guides this
analysis is that Chinese FDI is associated with the trade levels and market size of a
Caribbean country. I hypothesize that these factors function as determinants for China’s
decision to directly invest in specific countries across the Caribbean; and characterizes
the Caribbean as an attractive region for FDI.

Data and Measures
The dataset was compiled from a number of sources. First, the data for total
Chinese FDI stock in country and year were obtained from the Government of China,
National Bureau of Statistics, 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign
Direct Investment. The figures are in current millions of U.S. dollars. Second, the
import and export data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Data
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of Trade Statistics (various years). The IMF obtains their data following the Special Data
Dissemination Standard (SDDS) and, the National Summary Data Page (NSDP). The
trade data are also in current millions of U.S. dollars. Finally, as a measure of market
size, I obtained the data for per capita GDP from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (2013).
In 2008, the U.S. recession left the Caribbean vulnerable to economic instability.
The U.S., which has formally been the Caribbean’s largest trading partner, left the
Caribbean region questioning their economic status and viability. In 2008 China’s
investments into the Caribbean region exceeded U.S. $50 billion for the first time. This
began the rapid growth of Chinese FDI into the Caribbean at a time when world flows
were plunging in the midst of the financial crisis (ECLAC 2010). Thus, the dataset
begins in 2008, and ends in 2010 to capture the most recent data available that follows
IMF standards of certified data. However, there are some gaps in the data due to
insufficient information from host government countries across the respective years.
Lastly, this study evaluates the top six nations in the Caribbean with the highest
per capita GDP across the region for the stated time series of 2008-2010. The six
countries include: Jamaica, Cuba, Dominica, Barbados, Barb and Antigua, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines.
Statistical Model
This study is largely based upon statistical analysis of panel data. Therefore, the
author conducted multiple regression analysis in order to determine which explanatory
factors influence China’s FDI. The model may be described by the following equation:
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Model 1: Y’(FDI) =b0+b1(GDP per cpita) +b2(Chinese Trades) +e
Where FDI= Foreign Direct investment in Caribbean
GDP/Capita= Gross Domestic Product per capita in each country and year
Chinese Trade= the sum of Chinese exports and imports from Caribbean countries in
each year
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FINDINGS
Table 2
Pearson Correlation Analysis
Variables

Chinese Imports

Chinese Exports

FDI Stock

GDP per
capita

Chinese Imports

1.0000

Chinese Exports

0.5356***

1.0000

FDI Stock

0.7960***

0.4691

1.0000

-0.4697***

0.0861

-0.4519***

GDP per capita
1.0000

Note: ***p<.05 for two tailed test.
I begin with a discussion of the Pearson correlation matrix. As the findings in
Table 2 illustrate, Chinese imports and Chinese exports are positively correlated at the
0.05 significance level, which is an anticipated finding. Because of this high association,
I used a combined trade variable (the sum of exports and imports) to avoid collinearity of
the variables, a potential problem in multivariate regression. The results also reveal that
there is a strong positive correlation between FDI stock and Trade imports. This means
countries that are poorer according to their reliance upon imported goods are more likely
to require FDI to jump start their economy. Also, we observe a strong negative
correlation between Chinese imports and GDP, which is consistent with the previous
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finding and our hypothesis that poor countries as evidenced by low GDP demonstrate a
reliance upon imported goods. Similarly, the strong negative correlation between GDP
and FDI stock indicates that poorer countries as evidenced by a low GDP may be
implementing stronger incentive policies to attract Chinese FDI as a means of obtaining
capital to stimulate the economy.
Table 3
Multiple Regression Analysis of the Impact of Trade and GDP on FDI in the
Caribbean
Variable
Chinese Trade

Model
. 0319***
(.0065991)

GDP per capita

-.	
  0028061***
(.0002862)

Adjusted R-Squared

.75

Wald Chi-Squate

1557.07***

N

15

Note: The dependent variable is stock of Chinese FDI. Entries are unstandardized OLS regression
coefficients (panel corrected standard errors in parentheses).
***p<.01 (two tailed test)

The regression results are reported in Table 3. The model explains approximately
three-fourths of the variation in Chinese FDI among this sample of Caribbean countries
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(adjusted R2 is 0.75). The results also indicate that both independent variables are
statistically significant. The coefficient for Chinese trade is positive and significant at the
.01 level.7 These findings are consistent with our hypothesis in that those Caribbean
countries that rely upon imports from China are more likely to receive more FDI, with
this FDI taking the form of investments in infrastructure, agricultural and natural
materials. Likewise, the coefficient for GDP per capita is negative and significant. This
finding suggests that countries with lower GDP per capita are more likely to attract or
need FDI. Because the regression model specified holds trade constant, we cannot
determine whether the Caribbean’s reliance upon trade with China ultimately has a
negative impact on GDP that increases the need for FDI. Unfortunately, we are limited
by our data and model specification. However, a cyclical paradox of dependency would
not be surprising, if later research is able to pinpoint this relationship.
Although I was unable to estimate the effects of imports and exports separately in
the regression model (due to collinearity), it should be recalled that the Pearson’s
correlation analysis supports the hypothesis because exports do not have a strong
statistical relationship with FDI. China does not have an export-oriented market in the
Caribbean which accounts for the large disparity between imports and exports in the
region. The states in the Caribbean region are heavily reliant upon Chinese imports—
almost exclusively. Consequently, there is not a large export market. Thus, exports would
not affect FDI because in order for states to receive FDI they would largely be import
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  A separate model with the log transformation of trade produced results that are
completely consistent with Table 3. This suggests that the results are not distorted due to
large different in trade among these countries (probably due to the similar economic size
of most Caribbean economies).	
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based economies, and have a low GDP. Therefore, even the findings that do not achieve
statistical significance in the model lend credence to the hypothesis.
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CONCLUSION
This study sought to understand how Chinese FDI is allocated among countries in
the Caribbean. By compiling a dataset and conducting a statistical analysis of total trade
and GDP in relationship with FDI, the study has produced results that suggest that some
Chinese national interests (trade) are important. As discussed, the results for trade in the
regression model, along with the examples discussed in the review of the literature, are
consistent with a Neorealist view of the role of the Chinese state in FDI decisions. In
addition, by showing that a country’s GDP is inversely affected by FDI, this study has
clarified the economic indicators China looks for to invest in the Caribbean. As noted in
the literature and supported by this study, China seeks to build import based markets,
with low GDP countries becoming dependent upon FDI, in various forms – which is
consistent with Neorealism. The outcome is that Caribbean nations use FDI to stimulate
and develop their local economies and infrastructure, but at the expense of the
exploitation of their raw materials and natural resources, or by entering into binding
foreign policy commitments and contracts that are not necessarily politically or
economically beneficial to them in the long run (as suggested by World Systems theory).
This study has many implications for Caribbean countries. First, this research
identifies potential factors that China explicitly looks for when making the decision to
invest in Caribbean nations. However, it also discusses the possible negative affects FDI
based economies can have and are having in the Caribbean and Latin America. For
example, the large disparity between imports and exports, a new core-periphery model of
dependence that will ultimately hinder any form of permanent individual development,
and the social implications of natural resources and agriculture to the local economy. By
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looking at trade and FDI in relation to natural resources and foreign policy it is clear that
Chinese FDI is influenced by these factors, and that they play a large role in the decisionmaking process of how Chinese FDI is distributed among regions.
The main weakness I found in the study was a lack of data. Unfortunately, the
data are not available to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between
trade, GDP and FDI. Many developing countries simply lack any form of officially
reported data and with that it is difficult to track down which sectors China is investing
in, as well as the per capita GDP and total FDI stock for the Caribbean countries. This
study was completed with data that is officially available, however due to large gaps in
the data sets there is still not enough information to offer a comprehensive study.
Additionally, because the phenomenon is relatively new there are still many gaps in the
literature. Further studies are needed in order to fully address Chinese FDI in the
Caribbean.
Although there are limitations, this study contributes to the existing literature by
identifying some of the factors that China looks for in Caribbean nations when making
the decision to invest. Therefore, the study findings have relevant implications because it
highlights political, social, and economic concerns of the Caribbean region. I believe that
Chinese FDI can be beneficial to a nation’s economy because it allows many
underdeveloped countries the opportunity to make advancements; however, there are also
negative implications that have resulted in economic dependency and the exploitation of
raw materials and natural resources. With that in mind, this study advocates for the
implementation of strategic local level policies that address these risks, while also taking
advantage of the symbiotic benefits of FDI.
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